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1 INTRODUCTION 
What is the function of  morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus 
has recently emerged. Many philosophers now tell us that the function of  morality is to 
reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to smoothly and efficiently ensure 
the well-being of  its members.  
I think that it is time to subject this consensus to more rigorous scrutiny. My view is that 
the collection of  practices, beliefs and dispositions we call ‘morality’ is far more 
functionally complex than the standard story would have us believe. Morality may indeed 
reduce social tensions in certain contexts, but it may also inflame them in others, and it 
probably plays a variety of  other distinct roles in human societies. None of  these, I think, 
represents the primary function of  morality. However, I cannot argue for this positive view 
here. Instead, my task in this paper is primarily negative: I will attack the evidentiary 
relation between an evolutionary genealogy of  morals and the functional claim itself. I want to 
ask: suppose morality did emerge as the standard genealogy says that it did; could that story 
provide the basis for beliefs about morality’s current function? As I hope to show, it is far 
from clear that it can. 
My argument is thus a contribution to the wider debate over the role of  evolutionary 
biology in explanations of  human social life. While some theorists have wished to draw on 
ancient evolutionary history in order to motivate substantive conclusions about the 
function(s) of  human social practices, I will show that this type of  inference runs into a 
serious and possibly insurmountable epistemological problem. 
I will begin by describing the functional claim itself  before outlining the genealogical 
inference that often underlies it. I will then pose a problem for those who might wish to 
derive the function of  morality from its ancient history, and conclude with a few thoughts 
on how functional claims of  this sort might be established in a more responsible fashion. 
2 THE FUNCTION OF MORALITY 
The following is a representative set of  quotations from those who cleave to the functional 
hypothesis in question: 
Why do we have moral values? The obvious answer is that morality emerges 
as a system of  rules for getting people to function collectively in stable and 
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productive ways. We have morality to build a coherent social group. Moral 
values lead us to cooperate and prevent us from harming members of  our 
communities (Prinz 2007, p.32).  
Moral thinking has a function, I have argued—both evolutionarily and 
contemporarily…. The moralization of  our practical lives contributes to the 
satisfaction of  our long-term interests and makes for more effective 
collective negotiation by supplying license for punishment, justification for 
likes and dislikes, and bonding individuals in a shared framework of  
decision-making (Joyce 2006, p.208).  
[T]he evolutionary function of  moral judgments… is interpersonal 
coordination. Roughly, moral judgments are the products of  a mechanism that 
allows groups of  interacting individuals to co-ordinate their actions and 
emotions for mutual benefit. The function of  the moral habit is therefore 
to produce mutually beneficial co-operative patterns of  action and emotion 
(Sinclair 2012, p.14). 
The function of  morality is the enhancement of  social cohesion via the 
amplification of  our psychological altruistic dispositions (Kitcher 2005, 
p.178). 
 
The gloss varies, but the underlying idea is very similar. For each of  these philosophers, 
morality functions to reduce interpersonal conflict in a way that enables people to mutually 
flourish.  
Now, one easy way to attack such claims is to deny that there is a coherent, unified, 
historically stable phenomenon for us to study at all. I am sympathetic to those who worry 
that the category ‘morality’ is coarse-grained in the extreme, and also with those who 
complain that the reference of  the term seems to change depending on which literature 
one engages with.1 That said, in this paper, I will assume that this problem can be solved, 
and that there is some reason to treat ‘morality’ as a relatively unified, coherent, and 
historically stable phenomenon. Of  course, a complete theory of  this sort will require 
careful distinctions between moral behavior, moral language and moral judgment, especially 
since each of  these phenomena might have distinct functional profiles.2 However, since 
these phenomena are very closely related, I will continue to use the term ‘morality’ to refer 
                                                 
1 For example, the evolutionary-psychological literature displays a strong tendency to simply equate morality 
with some form of altruism. See (De Waal 2013). Philip Kitcher is more cautious, including certain capacities 
for normative guidance along with characteristic emotional responses (Kitcher 2011, ch.2). 
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation. 
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to a certain cluster of  dispositions, feelings and judgments, and I will assume that we have 
an intuitive grasp of  the phenomenon under study.3 
Now, it might be that some of  the philosophers quoted above would, if  pressed, 
distinguish the ancient or evolutionary function of  morality from its current function, that 
is, from the dispositions and characteristic effects it has in present-day societies. Nothing in 
this paper is meant to undermine claims about morality’s ancient functions. Rather, I am 
interested in a specific inference, namely, one which moves from the evolutionary function 
to the contemporary one. 
After all, the present-day functional claim at issue here is often, though not always, derived 
from an etiology of  moral belief  and practice. Kitcher is most explicit about the 
assumption which underlies the inference: 
[I conceive] the current human situation as analogous to that initially 
prompting the ethical project. As it was in the beginning, so too now—for 
the conflicts to which our ancestors’ lives were subject are mirrored in 
contemporary hostilities across the human population. According to this 
vision, the original function of  ethics—to remedy altruism failures—
remains primary. (Kitcher 2011, p.8) 
Similarly, Joyce argues that “[u]nderstanding how moral thinking enhanced the reproductive 
fitness of  our ancestors is likely to reveal something about how it continues to be generally 
useful to us”(Joyce 2006, p.107). Finally, as the quotations from Sinclair and Prinz illustrate, 
the inference is often implicit and unarticulated, since claims about current function and 
claims about evolutionary function are often woven together fairly seamlessly.  
To be clear, claims about morality’s current function can be supported in various ways, but 
in this paper I will critically evaluate the inference from morality’s deep explanatory history 
to its present function. This genealogical inference should be of  independent interest, since 
it appears to be sound in many domains of  inquiry, and since it seems intuitive that 
genealogical inquiry can help us to learn about the actual function of  various social 
practices. But what does this inference look like in the moral case, and how might it be 
supported?  
3 FUNCTIONALIST GENEALOGY 
Generally speaking, genealogy is a philosophical method which seeks to analyze or evaluate 
beliefs, values and social practices by studying their etiology.4 A functional genealogy delves 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Richard Joyce claims that moral judgment is itself an essentially linguistic phenomenon. See 
(Joyce 2006, p.111). 
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into history in order to establish that some value, belief  or practice plays a particular role in 
a social or a psychological system. It may not be immediately easy to see how an entity’s 
history can reveal its function, but, in fact, many philosophers have become attracted to 
this very idea. 
In order to see how this works, we should being by distinguishing between three distinct 
ideas that might be implicit in the concept function. The first is dispositional: the function of  
an entity is might be the characteristic effect it is disposed to produce within a larger 
system. The second is etiological: the function of  an entity is revealed by the best 
explanation for its emergence and/or persistence. The third is normative: an entity’s 
function is in part the thing it is supposed to do, in whatever sense we choose to attach to 
that word (Copp 1995, p.110-111). It is important to see that these three ideas can, in 
principle, come apart. A philosopher might argue that an entity produces characteristic 
effects within a system without claiming that this is connected to any etiological story, and 
without claiming that it is ‘supposed’ to produce these effects.  
A functional genealogist is someone who places some kind of  priority on the second, 
etiological sense. The basic idea is this: often, the best explanation for an entity’s emergence 
and persistence will be that it is disposed to produce some effect. When we have a 
reasonably complete and informative explanation of  this sort, it seems natural to conclude 
that the explanandum’s function is to produce those effects. Thus, we might say that token 
knives have the function of  cutting because cutting is the effect for which that type has been 
selected in the past.  
However, there are at least two different ways of  cashing out that “because”. A reductionist 
follows Larry Wright in reducing the normative and dispositional senses to the etiological 
one. Wright argued that an entity’s function simply is whatever effect it has within a system 
that explains why it exists in that system (Wright 1976).  However, this is a very strong 
claim, and I will not assume that any of  my critical targets in this paper are committed to it. 
I will generally construe them as adopting an alternative, non-reductionist approach, 
according to which a certain type of  etiology is powerful evidence for functional claims.  
This preserves the idea of  a functional-genealogical inference without inviting the various 
objections and counterexamples that follow on the heels of  reductive analyses. 
In any case, the core idea is that when an entity has a function, this is ultimately because it 
has a certain etiology. In its basic form, this theory remains popular amongst philosophers 
of  biology, and it is the basic framework under which a functionalist-genealogist seeks to 
provide historical explanations for morality’s emergence and persistence (Millikan 1984; 
                                                                                                                                               
4 The method is very common, and it cuts across the so-called ‘analytic/continental’ divide in philosophy. See 
(Rousseau 1755; Nietzsche 1887; Foucault 1977; Williams 2002; Prinz 2007, ch.6). 
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Neander 1991; Kitcher 1993)5.  After all, it is eminently plausible that various ethical 
beliefs, values and practices exist because they regularly produce some set of  effects. 
A functional-genealogist of  this sort can deploy multiple forms of  explanation.  Most of  
us are already familiar with one such mode, namely, explanation that cites descent via 
natural selection. However, Darwinian selection is not the only mechanism which can form 
the basis of  a functional-genealogical explanation. Other modes of  explanation are 
possible. For example, Hume’s genealogy of  property-conventions begins with the 
assumption that property-based moral practices are not ‘natural’ features of  human 
societies. He offers a basically game-theoretical reconstruction of  the origin of  justice 
which shows it to be a rational response to social conflict, and he can be read as arguing 
for a functional conclusion, that the amelioration of  this same conflict is the primary 
function of  property-conventions (Hume 1739/1740).6  
So, whether the mode of  explanation is explicitly Darwinian, or whether it emphasizes the 
culturally guided construction of  an artificial virtue, the functional-genealogist argues that a 
foray into the historical origins of  a set of  beliefs, values or practices can reveal the effect 
for which it was selected. She concludes that its current function is to produce that effect. 
In the case of  morality, the idea is that the relevant, function-fixing effect is the 
enhancement of  mutually beneficial social cohesion. 
So much for the nature of  functional genealogy. I will now begin to build my critical case, 
by arguing that genealogists of  morality very often fail to appreciate how demanding their 
own method is.  
4 THE FUNCTIONALIST’S BURDEN: CONTINUITY 
We may begin to illustrate the problem by making a simple observation: functions are 
deeply sensitive to environmental change. This is because nothing has an intrinsic function, 
that is, a role that it plays irrespective of  the properties of  larger system of  which it is a 
part. More precisely, 
(P) Given some entity E within some larger system S, and given some functional role 
that E plays in S, there are conditions—extrinsic to E itself—that must obtain 
within S in order for E to play its role.  
Call these enabling conditions. 
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking, Kitcher focuses on the notion of a design-explanation, but the result is effectively the same, 
since explanations which cite a kind of design point to selective pressures which ensure that only entities with 
certain dispositions survive. For criticism of the etiological model see (Cummins 1975).  
6 See (Owen 2010; Williams 2002) for this interpretation of Hume.  
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The idea of  an enabling condition allows us to get clearer on the nature of  functionalist 
genealogy. For it is precisely these conditions which must also play an explanatory role in 
such a genealogy. To take a simple example, we say that polar bear fur has the function of  
providing camouflage, but only because the bear’s current environment is white. This means 
that the color of  the bear’s environment is an enabling condition. But the explanation for 
why polar bears are now white also cites the whiteness of  their ancestral environment. 
Brown bears migrated north, we are told, and the color of  the Arctic environment ensured 
that those with white fur would have more offspring (Kurtén 1964). Thus, that the enabling 
condition obtained in the bear’s ancestral past explains why the species has white fur today. 
We can draw conclusions about the present-day function of  this fur because the relevant 
enabling conditions are also those that help to explain why the fur was adaptive. 
Now, suppose a population of  polar bears are (cruelly) relocated to the Amazon rainforest, 
where those conditions do not obtain. Is the polar bear’s fur malfunctioning, has it lost its 
function, or is it simply failing to perform its function? I take no position on these difficult 
questions, here. But we must remember that if  a thousand generations of  polar bears retain 
their white fur in the Amazon, we are forced by the logic of  the etiological account of  
functions to conclude that the fur has lost its original function. Whatever is explaining the 
trait’s persistence, it is not the effect for which it was previously selected.  
Taken together, these thoughts suggest a constraint on any functionalist genealogy of  any 
set of  beliefs, evaluative judgments, or social practices, in particular those genealogies 
which seek to infer conclusions about current functions from facts about ancient history. 
The functionalist-genealogist of  morality, as we have seen, wishes to argue that an 
evolutionary story can reveal morality’s function: in coming to appreciate why it arose and 
persisted, we learn about the function it plays in our own lives. (P) shows that there is a 
suppressed premise in this mode of  argumentation. Call S* the present-day system in 
which entity E is said to have the function that it (allegedly) developed in S. The strength 
of  an inference about E’s function in S* on the basis of  its development in S depends 
vitally on the following condition: 
(Continuity) Given the set of  enabling conditions that obtained in S when E developed, 
the same set of  conditions obtains in S* and in the recent history of  S*. 
A simple way of  summarizing this requirement is to note that we can ask: could E be 
reasonably expected to arise and persist in S* or in the recent history of  S*? If  not, this 
principle is not satisfied. 
I will try to illustrate the point with another example: suppose that a certain model of  car 
once became very popular because it ran well, and it ran well because of  an advanced filter-
system that removes impurities from the fuel, improving engine efficiency. We might want 
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to conclude that the filter now has the function of  improving engine efficiency. (Continuity) 
requires us to look at the system as a whole in order to rule out certain possibilities. We 
might suspect that modern versions of  the car run on fuel that has no impurities, for 
example. To rule out these (and other) possibilities is to establish (Continuity), since we will 
know that the enabling conditions that obtained in the car during the emergence and 
persistence of  the fuel-filter still obtain in contemporary versions of  the car. As I will stress 
later on, failure of  continuity does not entail the loss of  a function, but it does decisively 
weaken the strength of  the functional-genealogical inference. 
Now, we will have to pin down just what it means to say that ‘the same’ set of  conditions 
obtains here. A polar bear’s fur will still provide camouflage in a warm environment that 
has been painted white, even if  the original enabling condition (snow or ice) has vanished. 
So, this principle shouldn’t be taken to suggest that enabling conditions must remain 
continuous in some deep physical or metaphysical sense. Rather, the enabling conditions 
themselves must first be captured in functionally relevant terms: for the purposes of  the 
function in question, what matters about the bear’s original environment was that it was 
white. The description under which the enabling conditions help us to make sense of  the 
entity’s emergence and persistence must remain constant. This is how we should interpret 
(Continuity). 
The (Continuity) principle is the functionalist’s burden, and, as we shall see, it makes 
serious trouble for anyone who wants to derive claims about morality’s current function 
from its evolutionary history. 
5 GENEALOGIES OF MORALITY AND CONTINUITY 
In the case of  evolutionary genealogies of  human morality, (Continuity), I will now argue, 
is not satisfied. Most evolutionary accounts of  the emergence and persistence of  morality 
invoke roughly the same kinds of  initial conditions, and argue that a standard evolutionary 
mechanism—natural, sexual or perhaps group selection—can account for the emergence 
and persistence of  human morality (Ruse 1986; Axelrod 1984; Sober 1992; De Waal 2006). 
These initial conditions are familiar to anyone who’s engaged with the literature: Early 
humans, we are told, lived in small, genetically isolated groups of  50-150 individuals whose 
interactions were face-to-face; ‘defection’ (in the game-theoretic sense) was very dangerous 
to such groups, because they were routinely confronted by resource scarcity and threats 
from predators. Moreover, collective survival depended on motivationally effective long-
term prudential reasoning, but humans are typically bad at motivating themselves in 
accordance with such reasoning, in virtue of  their preference for short-term gain (Kitcher 
2006, p.11, 197, 393; Joyce 2006,p. 40-42).  These commonly-cited conditions help to 
explain why human morality is adaptive enough to evolve via natural selection. 
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Now, here, we come to the observation which drives my critique: a little reflection reveals 
that these conditions do not in any way characterize modern Western communities.7 In 
fact, these differences are so striking that we should be lead to wonder why anyone ever 
thought that the lives of  our hunter-gatherer ancestors were of  such importance with 
regards to the question of  morality’s current function. Hazarding a guess, I would say that 
these philosophers may be conflating two distinct ideas: first, that morality is innate, and 
second, that morality’s function is innate and therefore basically a human universal. This 
conflation might be what is going on in this passage from Sinclair: 
The seeming ubiquity of  the moral habit… and the fact that it develops in 
all normally brought-up humans with little formal instruction is (defeasible) 
evidence that [its] function is evolutionary. (Sinclair 2012, p.13) 
Unfortunately, while a trait might be innate, its function cannot be. A scientist who knew 
everything there was to know about the ontogeny of  a trait could not predict, on the basis 
of  that information alone, the function that the trait would eventually have in the life of  an 
organism. This question can only be answered by the additional examination of  the 
ecological system of  which the trait was (and is) a part, as the example of  the polar bear 
shows. 
This is what (Continuity) demands of  us. And I believe that it is very unlikely that 
(Continuity) will be satisfied for the standard evolutionary genealogy of  morality. If  we 
follow biologists in saying that niche-construction is the process by which an organism alters 
the selective pressures on its species by modifying its external environment, then we should 
say that we live on the other side of  a historical process which might be characterized as 
niche-construction run rampant (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Human beings have 
constructed institutions, forms and practices which are bigger and more complex than any 
ever seen on earth.  This process, as I will now show, has entirely erased the enabling 
conditions which, according to philosophers like Kitcher and Joyce, explain the emergence 
of  human morality and provide it with its original function.  
Of  course, we might wonder whether the relevant conditions aren’t similar enough. After all, 
at a certain level of  description, (Continuity) might seem to obtain. We still live in 
communities, we still need to get along with one another, and we still face various pressing 
co-ordination problems. However, as I will now show, such descriptions do not reflect the 
content of  the enabling conditions that philosophers and evolutionary theorists deploy in 
order to explain the emergence and persistence of  human morality. It will soon become 
very clear that morality could not be reasonably expected to evolve within communities like 
                                                 
7 I say modern Western community because I want to flag that the answer to this may vary from society to 
society. It is possible that other extant human societies will come closer to satisfying (Continuity), though 
probably not much closer.  
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ours, according to our best evolutionary models.  I’ll begin with Kitcher’s model before 
proceeding to Joyce’s.  
5.1 THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
In order to see why this is so, consider Kitcher’s first evolutionary enabling condition: 
group size. Almost every game-theoretical model which is said to explain the emergence of  
human pro-sociality requires a small population of  participants. Kitcher explains the 
emergence of  psychological altruism by offering a model which is based on optional games, 
or interactions between agents who can choose when and with whom to interact. He 
defines discriminating altruists as agents who “are prepared to play with any organism that has 
never defected on them, and, when they play, they always cooperate”(Kitcher 1998, p. 
501). His aim is to show that discriminating altruists embody a strategy that is collectively 
stable, or impervious to invasion by rival, less altruistic strategies.  
Kitcher defines selective defectors as agents who will play against any creature that has not 
defected on them and who will always defect. He proves that when the population size is 
small and members do not migrate often, the discriminating-altruist strategy cannot be 
overcome by selective defectors, because each interaction has a powerful influence over 
future interactions (Kitcher 1998). In the literature, this effect is called the ‘shadow of  the 
future’: players are more willing to co-operate because they become worried about their 
reputation. Yet, when the population grows, interactions with wholly new partners become 
more common, selective defection becomes much more advantageous. This is an instance 
of  a more general feature of  such models: they predict that larger populations are much 
more vulnerable to free-riders than smaller ones (Kerr and Bruun 1983). For example, 
Robert Axelrod’s highly influential explanations for the emergence of  altruism require that 
the probability that any two group agents will interact more than once is at least .5, and as 
high as .994, depending on the outcome in question (Axelrod 1984). 
In a band of  50 close-knit human beings who rarely migrate to other communities, such 
probabilities are almost guaranteed. Conversely, in a complex society consisting of  millions 
of  highly mobile individuals, they are next to impossible. In modern societies, the shadow 
of  the future is very small. 
Actually, the problem runs deeper than this: it is not even clear what it means to speak of  a 
single human ‘group’ in the modern western context. Kitcher’s solution to this problem is 
to argue that “causal interaction” now makes it the case that there is just a sole human 
group inhabiting the entire planet (Kitcher 2011, p.305).  None of  the game-theoretical 
models I’ve cited will explain the emergence of  altruism even within a population of  one 
thousand members, so it almost goes without saying that a modern group size of  seven 
billion represents a fairly decisive failure of  (Continuity). 
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Now, even if  we set this difficult problem aside and allow that there are several distinct 
human “groups”, modern individuals move from community to community with relative 
ease, and not only will we never interact with most people in our communities, a large 
chunk of  our actual interactions are with near-strangers that we will probably never meet 
again. This is one important way in which (Continuity) is not satisfied. The sheer size and 
fluidity of  modern populations makes it the case that morality could not have evolved in a 
world like ours.  
5.2 JOYCE AND MORAL JUDGMENT 
Joyce’s explanation for the emergence of the moral sense is multifaceted. When he needs 
to explain very basic, primitive altruistic motivations, he follows theorists like Axelrod and 
Kitcher, who explain the emergence of moral dispositions by citing the game-theoretic 
stability of reciprocity strategies. However, he insists that we do not have an explanation of 
morality until we know how more sophisticated, cognitively-laden judgments arose (Joyce 
2006, p.59). 
He argues that judgments of the form ‘x is required/forbidden’ arose because we are, by 
nature, bad prudential reasoners. That is to say, a human being without the capacity for 
moral judgment is very likely to sacrifice an overall long-term gain for a smaller, short-term 
benefit. Since the benefits which arise from increasing group stability are often opaque, 
group stability itself is often seriously threatened by this weakness. Joyce’s hypothesis is 
that moral judgment is the cure for this disease. Suppose that some non-cooperative 
action-type x provides short-term individual benefits at the expense of the group, reducing 
an agent’s long-term evolutionary fitness. By recruiting moralized emotions such as guilt, 
the judgment that x is forbidden makes it far less likely that the agent will do x, increasing 
both group stability and the agent’s long-term reproductive fitness (Joyce 2006, p.110-116). 
This is how moral judgment is adaptive, for Joyce. However, in order to assess whether 
(Continuity) obtains with respect to his story, we need to know what environmental 
conditions made it adaptive. Unfortunately, Joyce rests easy with claims about moral 
judgment “advancing reproductive fitness” in virtue of providing long-term benefits, but 
he does not, to my knowledge, provide evidence that this increase was substantial enough 
to drive the engines of natural selection (Joyce 2006, p.107). We shall have to fill in the 
details for him.  
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Fortunately, we have already encountered two widely-cited initial conditions here which 
make moral judgments strongly adaptive in Joyce’s sense.8 The first and most obvious is 
resource-scarcity: the sacrifice of greater long-term gain for a lesser short-term benefit can 
only reduce an organism’s reproductive fitness if it will die (or be severely weakened) by 
the loss of the long-term gain. The second is group instability: it has to be the case that 
individuals can significantly disrupt group functioning by acting selfishly, or by free-riding 
on the group’s cooperative ventures (Dunbar 2004; Van Vugt et al. 2007). 
Do such conditions exist now? Well, one fascinating feature of contemporary Western 
societies is that these conditions aren’t just erased, they’re arguably inverted. As Adam Smith 
famously predicted, certain modern forms of economic exchange make it the case that 
selfishness can contribute to group stability by provoking mutually beneficial competition 
(not cooperation!) and thereby increasing available public goods. This, arguably, has created 
correspondingly resilient communities which cannot be seriously disrupted by individual 
selfishness, since they often feed on that selfishness. Moreover, contemporary economies 
thrive on individuals who discount long-term gain in terms of short-term pleasure. Modern 
economic growth is not encouraged by the cautious spendthrift, it is driven by people who 
are willing to spend most of what they earn today rather than save for tomorrow (Danziger 
2004; Toossi 2002). 
In the hunter-gatherer context, private vices may indeed reliably lead to public disasters. 
However, as Bernard Mandeville saw, private vices can (and do) make for public benefits in 
a contemporary context (Mandeville 1714). The result is a cornucopic society comprised 
mainly of relatively secure individuals. By comparison with their ancient ancestors, the 
average European citizen has access to roughly 50 times as many resources, and as a result 
neither their health nor their survival depends on their making judgments which strengthen 
either (a) unselfish dispositions or (b) dispositions to ignore short-term gains in favor of 
long-term profits (Angus 2006). Taken together, this represents a complete inversion of the 
conditions under which moral judgments had to evolve, according to Joyce’s model. 
5.3 CONTINUITY FAILURE 
I suspect that examples such as the ones just described could easily be multiplied. However, 
the general point has, I hope, been made. In the case of  human morality, (Continuity) fails 
to obtain along multiple dimensions, and this makes serious trouble for the standard story, 
according to which the biological and (early) cultural evolution of  morality can provide 
evidence for claims about its current function. If  I am right, the evidentiary relation 
                                                 
8 One might worry that I am putting words in Joyce’s mouth, here, but since Joyce does not spell out his 
initial conditions, I can only speculate. Moreover, if he has different initial conditions in mind, my bet is that 
they will also be notably absent from contemporary societies.  
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between this moral genealogy and the standard functional conclusion is far weaker than has 
hitherto been supposed. 
What I am calling the ‘functionalist’s burden’ is just a result of  certain conditions having to 
play the two roles, explanatory and enabling, that I claim they must play if  a functional-
genealogical inference is to be warranted. Notice that if  we tried to secure more continuity 
between modern societies and those in which morality emerged, our genealogical account 
would lose its explanatory power, since it is not at all clear why morality should be expected 
to evolve in a large-scale society under conditions of  relative security and resource-
abundance. The mere fact that morality might be on-balance beneficial for those living in 
such a society is not enough to ground an evolutionary explanation; when people register 
concerns about the explanatory power of  just-so stories, this is exactly the point they are 
making (Gould 1980). We will have rescued (Continuity) by robbing the enabling 
conditions of  their explanatory force. 
Conversely, re-instating explanatory force by sticking to the original claim—that morality 
evolved in small-scale, unstable, resource-depleted societies—merely returns us to the 
problem at hand, namely, that (Continuity) is no longer satisfied. I conclude that the 
standard evolutionary account of morality does not give us the kind of information we 
need to say that morality has a certain function. Until we develop functionalist genealogies 
of morality which satisfy (Continuity), we remain in the dark with respect to such 
hypotheses. 
6 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
Thus far, my argument has been fairly simple. If  ascriptions of  functions on the basis of  
etiology are to be epistemically justified, (Continuity) must be satisfied. Yet, in the case of  
the evolutionary etiology of  morality, (Continuity) is not satisfied. Therefore, we cannot 
ascribe functions to morality on the basis of  its evolutionary history. I will now try to 
clarify and extend the argument by listing and responding to a few objections. 
6.1 FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION 
First, an opponent might accuse me of  a certain interpretive blunder.  “Surely,” they might 
claim, “the functional genealogist means to say more than this. In particular, the function 
of  morality is not supposed to be some accidental attachment to some independently 
specifiable social practice. Rather, the maintenance of  social cohesion is a constitutive 
function of  morality. ‘Morality’ just is whatever set of  practices maintains social cohesion, 
so it is not possible for it to lose this function.” 
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It is important to see that this response is unavailable to the functional genealogist. This, 
recall, is someone who wishes to uncover the function of  morality by looking at its etiology. 
But to define morality as whatever it is that maintains social cohesion is to abandon this 
project, for there can be no derivation of  morality’s function from its history if  we have 
already decided, in advance, that morality is whatever we find in the world that maintains 
social cohesion. Indeed, this is an inversion of  genealogical reasoning, which identifies a 
target and then asks whether the target’s history reveals anything of  interest. If  we have 
decided a priori that the thing we call ‘morality’ has a certain function, then genealogical 
inquiry into its functions is pointless. 
6.2 IS (CONTINUITY) TOO STRONG? 
I have claimed that in order for (Continuity) to obtain between a present-day and an 
ancestral system, the relevant enabling conditions must remain constant. However, it might 
be objected that this requirement is too strong. After all, as Kitcher stresses, certain 
analogues of the basic conditions that obtained when morality arose are still with us. Might 
it not still be the case that morality enables us to deal with these kinds of problems, even 
though they are not nearly as urgent for us as they were for our hunter-gatherer ancestors? 
Quite so, and this allows me to emphasize an important feature of my argument. My 
argument, I want to stress, is purely epistemological, and not conceptual or metaphysical. 
In other words, (Continuity) does not represent a necessary condition on the instantiation 
of a function, and I have not meant to suggest that a failure of (Continuity) entails that a 
given functional hypothesis is false. Rather, I want to say that when we are conducting 
specifically genealogical inquiry into the social function of a given set of beliefs or practices, 
(Continuity) is our best guide. Inasmuch as we wish to form beliefs about functions on the 
basis of a functionalist genealogy, we must ensure that something like my version of 
(Continuity) obtains. 
So, if we are committed to the view that moral dispositions and judgments can only be 
reasonably expected to evolve among groups of roughly 50-150 human beings, groups for 
whom internal disharmony can mean wholesale extinction, then that evolutionary story is 
of dubious evidentiary value in securing functional claims about contemporary morality. 
6.3 SELF-CREATED VESTIGIALITY 
Consider the following objection: “Of  course modern life is not like life in the Pleistocene, 
and this is precisely what the genealogy of  morality predicts. We now live lives of  
comparative comfort and safety in large-scale, centrally governed societies, but that is 
because of  morality. The evolutionary story is one of  hunter-gatherers facing a set of  
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problems; they solved them, and we no longer face such problems because we are their 
ancestors.” 
Doubtless, this could all be true. But it is not friendly to the idea that the present-day 
function of  morality is to reduce social tensions in a mutually beneficial fashion. What is 
interesting about this sort of  example is that we have an entity which, by performing its 
initial function, contributes to its own subsequent vestigiality. Our objector is painting a 
picture of  morality that is basically analogous. Yet, this is not a picture which supports the 
functional claim I am criticizing in this paper, rather, it decisively highlights one way in 
which evolutionary genealogies can fail to support conclusions about function(s) in 
modern-day contexts. After all, we have just discovered yet another way in which an entity 
can have a function that it subsequently loses. 
Now, there is, presumably, a historical point at which the relevant enabling conditions 
ceased to obtain in the modern world, when our societies became very large and 
comparatively secure. Assume, with our objector, that morality played a key role in bringing 
this about. I have argued that this looks like a case of  vestigiality. However, this isn’t quite 
right. In fact, two hypotheses present themselves: 
[Vestige] While morality initially enabled us to overcome the conditions, other 
institutions and practices now keep the enabling conditions at bay 
regardless of  the existence of  morality. Morality is, to this extent, vestigial.  
[Safeguard]  Ever since, morality has acted as a kind of  safeguard, one that is triggered 
only when the relevant enabling conditions reappear.  
In other words, either morality’s dispositional profile has largely vanished, or its functional 
dispositions have become masked (Johnston 1992)9. It might be thought that only the first 
hypothesis threatens the consensus I am criticizing. It is important to see, however, that the 
functional genealogists in question cannot accept either of  these hypotheses. There is no 
textual evidence to support the claim that when philosophers or biologists say that the 
function of  morality is to produce mutually beneficial social cohesion, they mean 
something like: ‘were humanity to return to a state of  resource scarcity and group 
instability, living in isolated groups of  50-150 members, morality would produce mutually 
beneficial social cohesion.’ In other words, not only is [Safeguard] entirely consistent with 
my critique, it quite clearly does not represent the position taken by any of  the adherents to 
the hypothesis I am criticizing. 
Yet, morality is still with us, and the needs it was designed to meet are (somehow) being 
met. Isn’t this good reason to think that it is still working to meet those needs? This, too, is 
not a good inference, for, as a matter of historical fact, many large structural changes have 
                                                 
9 I thank Pekka Väyrynen for this suggestion.  
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produced a large number of other distinct social practices which could easily be fulfilling 
these needs all on their own. 
First, the rise of wealth and cohesion in certain countries is strongly correlated with 
dramatic increases in state power. At no point in human history have states been more able 
to capture and punish individuals who do not conform to the law, and this has surely 
contributed to social cohesion all on its own, largely by punishing free riders. Second, 
prosperity and security is, arguably, the result of industrial capitalism and technological 
advancement. It would not be difficult to claim, as some theorists already have, that the 
current function of these institutions is the production of mutually beneficial social cohesion 
(Runge 1984).  
This is why the following inference is deeply problematic: 
Morality evolved to fulfill certain needs, 
Those needs are now being fulfilled. Therefore,  
 
Morality is now functioning to fulfill those needs. 
The inference is neither valid nor inductively strong, given the actual development of 
institutions and practices which almost certainly serve to fulfill the needs in question.  
6.4 MORALIZATION 
Admittedly, the preceding paragraphs have been overly simplistic, since the idea that we 
can cleanly separate such phenomena as economics, politics and morality is surely a 
theoretician’s fantasy. In particular, both politics and economics are deeply moralized, where 
by ‘moralization’ we simply mean the process by which the beliefs, practices and 
motivations characteristic of morality attach themselves to political and economic 
institutions (Rozin 1997). As Nico Stehr argues in a recent study, contemporary markets 
are indeed infused by moral attitudes and practices (Stehr 2006). Moreover, it is easy to see 
that allegiance to political parties is a deeply personal matter, one that conditions the moral 
self-image of a great many modern citizens. It is therefore somewhat misleading for me to 
suggest that the politics or economic activity could, “all on their own”, perform the 
function(s) that morality was selected to perform. 
Yet, why should we assume that the moralization of an institution necessarily promotes its 
characteristic function(s)? Reflection suggests that this can go either way, and the empirical 
evidence shows that the assumption is highly problematic. Stehr himself concludes that 
morality has both positive and negative effects on economic functioning (Stehr 2006, 
p.123-135). With respect to the political sphere, no observer of contemporary American 
politics can fail to notice the positively crippling effects that moralization has in this 
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domain. According to a widely-held hypothesis—for which there is a lot empirical 
evidence—major political change in the United States is currently next to impossible, 
simply because the civic sphere has become permeated with a conception of politics that 
can be fairly described as Manichean (Tavits 2007; Wisneski et al. 2011).  Plainly, the 
moralization of an institution can promote or hinder its characteristic functions. 
6.5 EXAPTATION 
Now, to some, it might seem incredible to suppose that such a deeply-ingrained social 
institution has no active functional profile whatsoever. It is important to see that the loss 
of  a primary function in the past does not entail the lack of  a functional profile in the 
present. This is due to a phenomenon—familiar to scientists but not much discussed by 
philosophers—called exaptation (Gould and Vrba 1998).10 
Biologists have long been recognized that a fixed trait can, given sufficient environmental 
change, acquire new functions while shedding old ones. Similar things could easily occur in 
the case of  social institutions. It is plainly possible that morality’s properties have made it 
suitable for this sort of  functional co-option. That is to say, while the idea of  morality as a 
social epiphenomenon might strike many as basically implausible, it may simply be that its 
characteristic role has changed over time.  
I think that a model of  social function which ignores exaptation is far less naturalistically 
respectable than one that allows for it.11 We may be sure that morality must be doing 
something for us, but the possibility of  exaptation means that we cannot infer that it is doing 
the same things that it did in the hunter-gatherer context. 
Notice, further, that my observations concerning the moralization of politics and 
economics actually support an exaptation hypothesis. Timothy Ryan finds that politicians 
who publicly reject cross-party compromise and consensus-building by deploying concepts 
such as right, wrong, principle and integrity are significantly more likely to be elected, and this 
must help to explain why morality continues to attach itself  to the political sphere (Ryan 
2016). This is a classic case of  a selection-explanation, since there is significant (artificial) 
selection-for moralistic politicians. If  Ryan is right, then the logic of  functionalist-
genealogy might force us to say that morality has been subject to exaptation in a certain 
respect. It is a human trait which may once have fostered unity and prosperity, but which 
                                                 
10 Jason Garson gives an illustrative example: “plant species of the genus Dalechampia probably first used resin 
secretions as a defense against herbivores; later, they became used as a reward system for pollinators” 
(Garson 2008). See also (Millikan 1984, p.32). 
11 In fairness to Kitcher, he acknowledges the possibility of what he labels “functional generation” (Kitcher 
2011, p.237-242). Yet, so far as I can tell, he simply assumes, a priori, that subsequently generated functions 
must be systematically related to what he calls the original function of ethical practice. In other words, he rules 
out a certain form of exaptation by fiat. 
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has been co-opted into a new system of  purposes, tragically serving to perpetuate a system 
that thrives on disunity and which positively hinders efforts to improve collective 
prosperity.  
All of  this being said, I am not officially committed to any exaptation hypothesis, since 
more evidence is certainly required. I mention this one only to highlight just one of  the 
many ways in which morality’s functional profile might be more complex and historically 
variable than many philosophers seem to admit.  
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have identified a common claim about the basic function of  morality in 
human societies. I have not tried to show that the claim is necessarily mistaken, but I have 
argued that a certain argument in favor of  the claim is not promising. Philosophers who 
wish to deploy the functional claim in support of  a larger philosophical program should no 
longer rely on ‘deep’ biological or cultural history in order to establish it.  
But all is not lost for the functional-genealogist, since there is plenty of  human history left 
on the table. If  she wishes to establish her preferred functional hypothesis, she can draw 
upon more nuanced methods of  deriving functions from social history, methods which can 
remain informative in a society as fantastically complex as our own. Here, Peter Godfrey-
Smith’s modern history theory of functions might be a good start. Godfrey-Smith writes: 
Biological functions are dispositions or effects a trait has which explain the 
recent maintenance of the trait under natural selection. This is the “modem 
history” approach to functions. The approach is historical because to 
ascribe a function is to make a claim about the past, but the relevant past is 
the recent past; modem history rather than ancient. (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 
p.344)  
The model is developed precisely in order to deal with cases of exaptation, which deeply 
problematize the attribution of functions to entities on the basis of their ancient histories. 
A genealogist of morality who adopted this model would be required to delve into recent 
cultural history—not something that contemporary analytic philosophers have been keen 
to do.12 But it is a task that may be necessary in order to establish the sorts of  claims that 




                                                 
12 For notable exceptions to this rule, see (Nichols 2002; Prinz 2007).  
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